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Abstract
Informally speaking, the categoricity of an axiom system means that its non-
logical symbols have only one possible interpretation that renders the axioms true.
Although non-categoricity has become ubiquitous in the second half of the 20th
century whether one looks at number theory, geometry or analysis, the first axiom-
atizations of such mathematical theories by Dedekind, Hilbert, Huntington, Peano
and Veblen were indeed categorical. A common resolution of the difference be-
tween the earlier categorical axiomatizations and the more modern non-categorical
axiomatizations is that the latter derive their non-categoricity from Skolem’s Para-
dox and Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorems, while the former, being second order,
suffer from a heavy reliance on metatheory, where the Skolem-Go¨del phenomenon
re-emerges. Using second order meta-theory to avoid non-categoricity of the meta-
theory would only seem to lead to an infinite regress. In this paper we maintain
that internal categoricity breaks this traditional picture. It applies to both first and
second order axiomatizations, although in the first order case we have so far only
examples. It does not depend on the meta-theory in a way that would lead to an
infinite regress. And it covers the classical categoricity results of early researchers.
In the first order case it is weaker than categoricity itself, and in the second or-
der case stronger. We give arguments suggesting that internal categoricity is the
“right” concept of categoricity.
1 Introduction
The concept of categoricity of a formal theory was introducedwith this name by Veblen
[18], who notes that the name was suggested to him by John Dewey. Veblen introduced
∗I am indebted to John Baldwin for his critical reading and comments on an earlier manuscript of this
paper, and to Roman Kossak for a discussion on models of arithmetic in relation to this paper. I am also
indebted to the referees for valuable remarks.
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this concept in the context of geometry, but it turned out to have a vastly more general
applicability. Veblen defines:
Inasmuch as the terms point and order are undefined one has a right, in
thinking of the propositions, to apply the terms in connection with any
class of objects of which the axioms are valid propositions. It is part of our
purpose however to show that there is essentially only one class of which
the twelve axioms are valid. In more exact language, any two classes K
and K ′ of objects that satisfy the twelve axioms are capable of a one-to-
one correspondence such that if any three elementsA,B, C ofK are in the
orderABC, the corresponding elements ofK ′ are also in the orderABC.
Consequently any proposition which can be made in terms of points and
order either is in contradiction with our axioms or is equally true of all
classes that verify our axioms. . . .A system of axioms such as we have
described is called categorical . . .
In modern terminology we would say that the twelve axioms of Veblen are categor-
ical in the following sense:
Definition 1. A set of axioms1 is categorical if any two of its models are isomorphic.
Veblen points out what we would now call the completeness of categorical axiom
systems: for any given sentence φ in the vocabulary of the axioms, either φ follows2
from the axioms or ¬φ follows. As Veblen notes, the concept had been already used
with a different name by Huntington [7], who calls it ‘sufficiency’, and by Hilbert [5],
who is less explicit about it. For an excellent survey of the history of categoricity and
completeness, we refer to [1].
If L is a vocabulary, i.e. a set of relation, function and constant symbols, an L-
model (or an L-structure) M consists of a domain M , which is a non-empty set, to-
gether with an interpretation of the symbols of L in the set M . Respectively an L-
sentence of first (or second) order logic is a sentence the non-logical symbols of which
are in L. The interpretation of a relation symbol R is denoted RM, the interpretation
of a function symbol f is denoted fM, and the interpretation of a constant symbol c
is denoted cM. Isomorphism M ∼= M′ of L-structures M and M′ is defined in the
usual way. In this paper identity = is considered a logical symbol and therefore we
do not explicitly mention whether identity is included in the vocabulary or not. The
interpretation of identity is always equality. If M is an L-structure and L′ ⊆ L, then
M ↾ L′ denotes the reduct ofM to the vocabulary L′.
The most famous as well as historically the first categorical axiomatization of a
mathematical structure is Dedekind’s second order axiomatization of elementary arith-
metic. Note that in the second order setup the arithmetic operations of addition and
multiplications are definable from the successor relation.
1For this definition to make sense it does not matter in which formal language the axioms are written as
long as the concepts ofmodel and isomorphismmake sense. In this paper the axioms are first or second order
axioms.
2In modern terminology Veblen’s concept of “follows” would be perhaps best called a semantic conse-
quence relation.
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Example 2 (Dedekind). Let us consider the vocabulary {s, 0} of the theory of the
successor function on the natural numbers. The second order sentenceN2(s, 0):
∀xy(s(x) = s(y)→ x = y) ∧
∀x¬s(x) = 0 ∧
∀X((X(0) ∧ ∀x(X(x)→ X(s(x))))→ ∀xX(x))
(1)
is categorical with the unique (up to isomorphism) model (N, f, 0), where f(x) = x+1.
Since in second order logic we can existentially quantify over the function s and
the constant 0, we can axiomatize the countably infinite domain:
Example 3. The second order sentence I2 = ∃F∃xN2(F, x) is categorical with the
unique (up to isomorphism) model3 N.
Example 2 is different from Example 3 in the following important respect. If we
take two models of N2(s, 0), there is a unique isomorphism between them. But if
we take two models of the sentence I2 of Example 3, there is an isomorphism (i.e. a
bijection) between the models but the isomorphism is by no means unique, because the
set N permits a continuum of different bijections.
Example 4. We consider the vocabulary {R, ε}, whereR is unary and ε is binary. The
second order sentence P 2:
I2 relativized (see below for the definition of relativization) to R ∧
∀xy(xεy → R(x))∧
∀xy(∀z(zεx↔ zεy)→ x = y)∧
∀X∃x∀y(R(y)→ (X(y)↔ yεx))
(2)
is categorical with the unique (up to isomorphism) model (P(N),∈,N), where ∈ is the
usual membership-relation between elements of N and elements of P(N).
Again we may note that the isomorphisms manifesting the categoricity of P 2 are
not unique because of the many automorphisms of the R-part. However, if the isomor-
phism is fixed on the R-parts, the rest is unique.
Example 5 (Huntington). The second order axiomatization R2 of the completely or-
dered field of real numbers, i.e. the conjunction of the first order axioms of ordered
fields and the following Least Upper Bound Principle:
∀X((∃xX(x) ∧ ∃y∀x(X(x)→ x < y))→
∃y(∀x(X(x)→ (x < y ∨ x = y))∧
∀y′(∀x(X(x)→ (x < y′ ∨ x = y′))→ (y < y′ ∨ y = y′)))),
(3)
is categorical with the unique (up to isomorphism) model (R,+, ·, 0, 1, <). The usual
proof of the categoricity proceeds by first isolating the natural numbers as 0, 1, 1 +
1, 1+1+1, . . ., then the rationals, and then the reals as the completion of the rationals.
The isomorphism between any two models of R2 is unique.
3Of the empty vocabulary.
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As a final example, let us consider set theory:
Example 6 (Zermelo). Let ZFC2 be the conjunction of the second order Zermelo-
Fraenkel axioms, obtained from the ordinary Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms by replacing
the Separation and Replacement Schemas by their second order versions. Models of
ZFC2 are, up to isomorphism, of the form (Vκ,∈), where κ > ω is inaccessible. Since
there may be many inaccessibles, ZFC2 is not categorical unless we make large car-
dinal assumptions. However, as emphasised already by Zermelo [20], ZFC2 is cate-
gorical in the weaker sense that if the height of the model is fixed, then there is, up to
isomorphism, only one model. This weak form of categoricity of ZFC2 is sometimes
called quasi-categoricity.
The range of categoricity among second order theories is extensive. In fact, it is
very hard to find a structure which would be not second order characterizable, without
using a cardinality argument or the Axiom of Choice, see [8].
2 Preliminaries
We considered above some examples of categoricity. Let us now set the stage for
a more general approach. The remarkable property of second order logic is that it
can express the categoricity of its own sentences. To see what this means we have to
introduce some notation.
Let us consider a finite vocabulary L = {R1, . . . , Rα, f1, . . . , fβ} and a unary
predicate U not in L. If M is an L ∪ {U}-structure, let the L-structure MU be the
relativization of M ↾L to the interpretation of the predicate U . For MU to be a legit-
imate L-structure, something has to be assumed about the interpretation of U as well
as about the interpretations of the function symbols inM. Let Res{f1,...,fβ}(U) be the
conjunction of the first order sentences
∃x1U(x1)
∀x1 . . . xn((U(x1) ∧ . . . ∧ U(xn))→ U(fj(x1, . . . , xn))),
(4)
where j ∈ {1, . . . , β}. Certainly,M satisfies Res{f1,...,fβ}(U) if and only if M
U is an
L-structure. If φ is a second order sentence, we let φU denote the result of relativizing
φ to U . Thus in φU all first order quantifiers are restricted to range over elements of U ,
and the second order variables are restricted to range over subsets ofU , relations overU
and functions on U . In consequence, if φ is an L-sentence andM |= Res{f1,...,fβ}(U),
then
M |= φU ⇐⇒ MU |= φ. (5)
Let L′ = {R′1, . . . , R
′
α, f
′
1, . . . , f
′
β} be another vocabulary, where the arity of each
R′i is the same as the arity of Ri and the same for the function symbols. We assume
L∩L′ = ∅. If φ is a second order sentence, we use φ′ to denote the result of replacing
each Ri by R
′
i and fj by f
′
j in φ. Let U
′ be a new unary predicate symbol not in
L∪L′ ∪{U}. Let ISOL,L′(F,U, U
′) be the second order sentence which says that the
4
function F defines an isomorphism between the L-part relativized to U and the L′-part
relativized to U ′, i.e. ISOL,L′(F,U, U
′) is the conjunction of the first order sentences
∀x(U(x)→ U ′(F (x)))
∀xy(F (x) = F (y)→ x = y)
∀x(U ′(x)→ ∃y(U(y) ∧ F (y) = x))
∀x1 . . . xn(Ri(x1, . . . , xn)↔ R′i(F (x1), . . . , F (xn)))
∀x1 . . . xn(F (fj(x1, . . . , xn)) = f ′j(F (x1), . . . , F (xn))),
where i ∈ {1, . . . , α} and j ∈ {1, . . . , β}.
Definition 7. For any second order L-sentence φ, the second order4 sentence CATφ of
the empty vocabulary is defined as follows:
CATφ : ∀UU
′R1 . . . RαR
′
1 . . . R
′
αf1 . . . fβf
′
1 . . . f
′
βCAT
+
φ .
where CAT+φ is
(Res{f1,...,fβ}(U) ∧ Res{f ′1,...,f ′β}(U
′) ∧ φU ∧ φ′U
′
)→ ∃F ISOL,L′(F,U, U ′).
Lemma 8. Suppose φ is a second order L-sentence. The following conditions are
equivalent:
(C1) φ is categorical.
(C2) CATφ is valid in the empty vocabulary.
(C3) CAT+φ is valid in the vocabulary L ∪ L
′ ∪ {U,U ′}.
Proof. To see this, suppose first (C1). We show that CATφ is valid. SupposeM is an ar-
bitrary non-empty set. We can considerM the domain of a model of the empty vocabu-
lary i.e. the vocabulary of CATφ. LetM be theL∪L
′∪{U,U ′}-structure resulting from
interpreting the non-logical symbols of L∪L′∪{U,U ′} in the domainM in some arbi-
trary way. Let us assumeM satisfies Res{f1,...,fβ}(U)∧Res{f ′1,...,f ′β}(U
′)∧φU ∧φ′U
′
.
Thus, by (5), (M ↾ L ∪ {U})U is an L-structure satisfying φ. Respectively, (M ↾
L′ ∪ {U ′})U
′
is an L′-structure satisfying φ′. Changing vocabularies, the categoric-
ity of φ yields M |= ∃F ISOL,L′(F,U, U ′). Clearly, (C2) implies (C3). Finally,
assume (C3). Let M1 and M2 be two L-models of φ. By changing the vocab-
ulary, we can translate M2 into an L
′-model M′2 of φ
′. Since L ∩ L′ = ∅, we
can form an L ∪ L′ ∪ {U,U ′}-structure M such that (M ↾ L ∪ {U})U = M1 and
(M↾L′ ∪ {U ′})U
′
=M′2. By (C3),M |= ∃F ISOL,L′(F,U, U
′), whenceM1 ∼= M2.
It should be noted that even though CATφ has no non-logical symbols, there is a
marked difference between CATφ being true in a model (of the empty vocabulary) and
it being valid in all models (of the empty vocabulary). There is nothing surprising in
4For simplicity, we use same names for second order relation (or function) variables and for (first order)
relation and function symbols.
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this. Truth in a model is, in logic in general, very far from being equivalent to truth in
all models. However, the case of CATφ is a very special one.
The truth of CATφ in a model of (the empty vocabulary) of cardinality κ means
the same as categoricity of φ in models of cardinality ≤ κ. In other words, despite
its appearance, the sentence CATφ does not state the categoricity of φ, because of size
limitations. It is only the proposition CATφ is valid which states it.
For the categoricity of φ it obviously suffices that CATφ has arbitrarily large mod-
els. If we let κ denote the Hanf-number5 of second order logic then it suffices that
CATφ is true in a model of cardinality κ of the empty vocabulary. Since the Hanf-
number of second order logic is less than the first extendible cardinal ([10]), for φ to
be categorical it suffices that CATφ has a model of size at least the first extendible
cardinal.
3 Internal categoricity
The idea behind internal categoricity is the observation that in familiar cases of categor-
ical second order sentences φ the sentence CATφ is not only valid but even provable.
This is remarkable because second order logic does not have a similar Completeness
Theorem as first order logic. So there is no a priori reason why a valid sentence would
be provable.
Following [6] we include in the axioms of second order logic the following schema:
Suppose L is a vocabulary. The L-Axiom Schema of Comprehension is the following
set of second order sentences:
∀x1 . . . xn∀X1 . . .Xk∃X∀y1 . . . ym(X(y1, . . . , ym)↔
φ(x1, . . . , xn, X1, . . . , Xk, y1, . . . , ym)),
(6)
where φ(x1, . . . , xn, X1, . . . , Xk, y1, . . . , ym) is an arbitrary second order L-formula
not containingX free. By provability in second order logic we mean provability from
the axioms of second order logic including (6). The schema (6) is non-trivial even
when φ(x1, . . . , xn, X1, . . . , Xk, y1, . . . , ym) is first order.
Definition 9. Suppose L is a vocabulary. A second order L-sentence φ is internally
categorical if the sentence CATφ (or equivalently, CAT
+
φ ) is provable in second order
logic.
Since provable sentences are valid, internal categoricity implies categoricity. More-
over, internal categoricity can be established for important categorical sentences:
Theorem 10. The following second order sentences are internally categorical:
1. The axiomatizationN2 of (N, s, 0). ([11], [3], [13], [19]).
2. The axiomatization I2 of N in the empty vocabulary.
3. The axiomatization P 2 of (P(N),∈,N).
5The Hanf number of a logic is the least cardinal such that if a sentence of the logic has a model of size
at least κ, it has arbitrarily large models.
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4. The axiomatizationR2 of (R,+, ·, 0, 1, <).
Proof. For a soft proof one can use Theorem 12 below. In all cases the proof is the
classical proof of categoricity. When one examines the classical proof carefully, noth-
ing beyond the axioms of second order logic is used. Of course, (6) is heavily used,
although not in its full generality.
The idea of the internal categoricity of N2 appears already in [11]. In fact, when
categoricity of a sentence φ is defined in [9] (English translation [14]), it is not defined
as the truth of CATφ, but as the provability of CATφ in the simple theory of types.
We go further and require provability in second order logic itself. The phrase ‘internal
categoricity’ was introduced in the context of arithmetic in [19]. It was advocated more
generally in [15], with more details in [17]. We refer to [2] for a recent discussion on
this concept.
The point of internal categoricity is that it establishes categoricity without requiring
a set-theoretic background (meta-)theory. Internal categoricity of, say N2 or R2, is an
“internal” property of second order logic itself. Likewise, the proof of CATφ gives
finite evidence of the categoricity of φ. Again, there is no need to refer to set theory or
“full semantics” (see below). The appealing contention that the categoricity of second
order axiomatizations of familiar mathematical structures requires “full” second order
logic, with set-theoretical semantics, would be simply wrong.
Although second order logic does not have a Completeness Theorem in the same
sense as first order logic, there is a more general concept of semantics, due to Henkin
[4], which permits a Completeness Theorem. In this more general semantics we do not
let bound second order variables, such as U,U ′, Ri, R
′
i, gi, f
′
i , F in CATφ above, range
over all possible relations (and functions) over the given domainM but just over ele-
ments of a set G of relations (and functions) onM . This is in line with the development
in first order logic, made completely explicit in the proof of Go¨del’s Completeness The-
orem, to consider arbitrary models, with arbitrary relations, functions and elements to
interpret the non-logical symbols, even if one is interested in number theory, where the
functions symbols + and × have a clear intended meaning. In second order logic the
intended meaning of the range of second order variables (for subsets of the domain) is
the entire power-set of the domain, but we allow the more general set G as the range in
order to achieve a Completeness Theorem.
Definition 11 ([4]). Suppose L is a vocabulary. The combination (M,G) of an L-
structure M and a set G satisfying the L-Axiom Schema of Comprehension is called a
Henkin L-model.
Intuitively speaking the set G of a Henkin L-model (M,G) is closed in the sense
that any set or relation that can be defined from the interpretation of the symbols of
L by means of quantification over G is actually already in G. The schema (6) is quite
strong even in the case that L = ∅.
It goes without saying that the set of all subsets and relations of a given domain
M satisfies (6). Likewise, it is obvious that in any Henkin model (M,G) the set G is a
Boolean algebra which contains all finite subsets ofM , as well as the interpretations of
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the symbols of L. Because of the strong impredicativity6 of (6) it is a non-trivial task
to construct Henkin models satisfying (6). The method of Henkin [4] yields examples
of such (M,G) with countable G andM .
The point of Henkin models is:
Theorem 12 ([4]). Suppose L is a vocabulary. A second order L-sentence is provable
if and only if it is valid in all Henkin L-models.
By combining Definition 9 and Theorem 12 we get:
Theorem 13. Suppose L is a vocabulary. A second order L-sentence φ is internally
categorical if the sentence CATφ is true in all Henkin models.
Theorem 13 explains why internal categoricity is called “internal”: It is internal in
the sense of being internal to each G, namely, it is required that if the interpretations
of the symbols of the vocabulary are in G, then so is the interpretation of F . Noth-
ing is claimed about interpretations outside G. Since Henkin semantics satisfies the
Compactness Theorem, the sentences N2 and R2 are not categorical across Henkin
models, i.e. there are Henkin models of e.g. N2 which are non-standard. For every
fixed G there is a unique model ofN2, but different G may give rise to non-isomorphic
models.
For second order set theory ZFC2 internal categoricity holds only in the weaker
sense of quasi-categoricity explained in Example 6. However, for example, for
ZFC2 + “there are no inaccessible cardinals > ω”
internal categoricity can be proved [17].
Our list of internally categorical second order sentences is only the beginning.
There are many more examples. In fact, it would be rather surprising if there were an
example of a mathematical structure, constructed without the use of Axiom of Choice,
a cardinality argument, or the enumeration techniques a` la Go¨del, which did not have
an internally categorical second order characterization.
In sum, the classical categoricity results of second order logic, due to Dedekind,
Veblen and others, hold in the stronger sense of internal categoricity. The advantage of
internal categoricity is that it has always a finite proof in the formal language of second
order logic itself. Therefore it does not depend on set-theoretical meta-theory in the
same sense as ordinary categoricity.
4 First order internal categoricity—mapping the land-
scape
Because of the extraordinary ability of second order logic to express the categoricity of
its own sentences, it would seem that internal categoricity, based on the assumption of
the categoricity statement holding in all Henkin models, has no role in first order logic.
6The relation X that is defined by φ(x1, . . . , xn,X1, . . . , Xk, y1, . . . , ym) occurs in the range of the
universally and existentially quantified second order variables in φ(x1, . . . , xn,X1, . . . , Xk, y1, . . . , ym).
8
However, this is far from true. We will show that first order arithmetic and first order
set theory have a form of internal categoricity, reminiscent of the internal categoricity
of their second order cousins. But we do not (know how to) define a general concept
of first order internal categoricity. Rather, we are mapping the landscape in search of a
good definition. At the moment we have just a few examples.
First order theories are not categorical per se. Their defining characteristic is the
existence of models of all infinite cardinalities and in many important cases also the
existence of non-standard models in each infinite cardinality separately. First order
internal categoricity has to circumvent these undeniable facts.
Let us start with first order Peano arithmetic. Let P (+, ·) be the infinite set of
Peano axioms with the Schema of Induction
∀x1 . . . xn((φ(0, x1, . . . , xn)∧
∀y(φ(y, x1, . . . , xn)→ φ(y + 1, x1, . . . , xn)))→
∀yφ(y, x1, . . . , xn)),
(7)
where 0 and 1 are defined terms denoting the identity elements of+ and ·, respectively.
Ordinarily we assume that the formula φ(y, x1, . . . , xn) of (7) is any first order for-
mula of the vocabulary {+, ·} of arithmetic. However, given a vocabulary L, let us
use P (+, ·, L) to denote the extension of P (+, ·) where the Induction Schema (7) is
formulated for first order formulas φ(y, x1, . . . , xn) of the vocabulary {+, ·} ∪ L.
Theorem 14 (Internal categoricity of Peano arithmetic). SupposeM is a model of
P (+, ·, {+′, ·′}) ∪ P (+′, ·′, {+, ·}). (8)
Then there is π : M ↾ {+, ·} ∼= M ↾ {+′, ·′}. Moreover, the mapping π is first order
definable on M.
Proof. Note thatM may very well be a non-standard model of any infinite cardinality.
Let 0 and 1 be the first elements ofM↾{+, ·}, and respectively 0′, 1′. Letψ(x, u, v) say
that x codes, using + and ·, an initial segment I with the last element u, ofM↾{+, ·},
an initial segment I ′ with the last element v, ofM↾{+′, ·′}, and a function f : I → I ′
such that f(0) = 0′, f(y + 1) = f(y) +′ 1′ for all y ∈ I \ {u}, and f(u) = v. Let
φ(u, v) be the formula ∃xψ(x, u, v).
First we show by induction on a that for every a ∈ M there is b ∈ M such that
M |= φ(a, b). If a = 0, then we need only code the pair (0, 0′) to make φ(0, 0′)
true. Suppose then φ(a, b) is true. Let x, I, I ′ and f be as in ψ(x, a, b). Clearly,
f(1) = 1′. Let I1 be I with a+ 1 added, and similarly I
′
1. Extend f to f1 by mapping
the last element a + 1 of I1 to the last element b +
′ 1′ of I ′1. By coding I1, I
′
1 and
f1 we get x1 such that ψ(x1, a + 1, b +
′ 1′). Thus φ(a + 1, b +′ 1′) is true. By the
Induction Schema, sinceM satisfies P (+, ·, {+′, ·′}), for every a ∈M there is b such
that M |= φ(a, b). Analogously, since M satisfies P (+′, ·′, {+, ·}), we can prove by
induction inM↾{+′, ·′} that for every b ∈M there is a such thatM |= φ(a, b).
Next we show by induction on a that if φ(a, b) and M |= φ(a, b′), then b = b′.
Suppose first φ(0, b) and φ(0, b′). Let x, I, I ′ and f be as in ψ(x, 0, b), and x1, I1, I
′
1
and f ′ as in ψ(x1, 0, b
′). Then b = f(0) = 0′ and b′ = f ′(0) = 0′. Thus b = b′.
Suppose then φ(a+1, b)∧φ(a+1, b′) is true. Let x, I, I ′ and f be as in ψ(x, a+1, b),
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and x1, I1, I
′
1 and f
′ as in ψ(x1, a+ 1, b
′). Since we assume that a satisfies the claim,
f(a) = f ′(a). Hence b = f(a+ 1) = f(a) +′ 1′ = f ′(a) +′ 1′ = f ′(a+ 1) = b′. By
the Induction Schema, since M satisfies P (+, ·, {+′, ·′}), for every a ∈ M there is a
unique b such thatM |= φ(a, b).
Note that if φ(a, a′) and φ(b, b′) with x, I, I ′ and f witnessing ψ(x1, a, a
′) and
x1, I1, I
′
1 and f
′ witnessing ψ(x1, b, b
′), then f(y) = f ′(y) for y ∈ I ∩ I ′. This is
because the claim clearly holds for y = 0, and if it holds for y, then f(y + 1) =
f(y) +′ 1′ = f ′(y) +′ 1′ = f ′(y+1). So the claim follows by induction inM↾{+, ·}
asM satisfies P (+, ·, {+′, ·′}).
Finally, we show that the relation F = {(a, b) ∈ M ×M : M |= φ(a, b)} is an
isomorphismM↾{+, ·} →M↾{+′, ·′}. Suppose α, β and γ are such that α+ β = γ.
Suppose x, I, I ′ and f witness ψ(x, γ, f(γ)). By the above, f ⊆ F . We use induction
on β in M ↾ {+, ·}, to prove that f(α) +′ f(β) = f(γ), appealing to the fact that M
satisfies P (+, ·, {+′, ·′}). If β = 0, then α = γ and
f(α) +′ f(β) = f(α) +′ f(0) = f(α) +′ 0′ = f(α) = f(γ).
Assume then β = δ + 1. Now
f(α) +′ f(β) = f(α) +′ f(δ + 1) = f(α) +′ f(δ) +′ 1′ =
= f(α+ δ) +′ 1′ = f(α+ δ + 1) = f(α+ β) = f(γ).
Suppose then α, β and γ are such that α · β = γ. We use induction on β in
M ↾ {+, ·} to prove that f(α) ·′ f(β) = f(γ), appealing to the fact that M satisfies
P (+, ·, {+′, ·′}). If β = 0, then γ = 0 and
f(α) ·′ f(β) = f(α) ·′ f(0) = f(α) ·′ 0′ = 0′ = f(γ).
Assume then β = δ + 1. Now
f(α) ·′ f(β) = f(α) ·′ f(δ + 1) = f(α) ·′ (f(δ) +′ 1′) =
= f(α) ·′ f(δ) +′ f(α) ·′ 1′ = f(α · δ) +′ f(α) = f(α · δ + α) = f(γ).
Since π above is definable and “π : M ↾ {+, ·} ∼= M ↾ {+′, ·′}” is a first order
statement—let us denote it ISOM(+, ·,+′, ·′)—we can rephrase the above theorem as
a theorem of first order logic:
Corollary 15 (Internal categoricity of Peano arithmetic in first order logic).
P (+, ·, {+′, ·′}) ∪ P (+′, ·′, {+, ·}) ⊢ ISOM(+, ·,+′, ·′). (9)
The internal categoricity of first order arithmetic may seem simply false on the
basis that there are a continuum of non-isomorphic countable models of Peano’s ax-
ioms. Indeed, suppose (N,+′, ·′) is a non-standard model of Peano arithmetic such
that +′ and ·′ are ∆02-definable (by [12]) as relations. Then (N,+, ·,+
′, ·′) satis-
fies P (+, ·, {+′, ·′}) and P (+′, ·′), but there is no reason to think that it satisfies
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P (+′, ·′, {+, ·}), for when the ∆02-definable relations x +
′ y = z and x ·′ y = z
are constructed, only induction for formulas involving +′ and ·′ are (or can be) con-
sidered. We know that (N,+′, ·′) cannot satisfy N2, so it is interesting to note that the
failure of the Induction Axiom of (1) in (N,+′, ·′) is manifested by the failure to satisfy
P (+′, ·′, {+, ·}).
We now move to set theory. The first order analogue of ZFC2 is the Zermelo-
Fraenkel axiom system ZFC. Let us denote the vocabulary of this theory {ε1}. To
formulate internal categoricity of ZFC we introduce another binary symbol ε2 and
compareZFC in the vocabulary {ε1}, denotedZFC(ε1), and ZFC in the vocabulary
{ε2}, denoted ZFC(ε2). If we allow symbols from a new vocabularyL to occur in the
Separation Schema and the Replacement Schema ofZFC(ε1), we denote the extended
theory ZFC(ε1, L). Similarly ZFC(ε2, L).
The second order theory ZFC2 is not categorical per se. One has to fix the (in-
accessible) cardinality of the model. In the first order context we accomplish this by
assuming that the two models have the same domain.
Theorem 16 (Internal categoricity of first order ZFC, [16]). SupposeM is a model of
ZFC(ε1, {ε2}) ∪ ZFC(ε2, {ε1}).
Then there is π : M ↾ {ε1} ∼= M ↾ {ε2}. Moreover, the mapping π is first order
definable on M.
We may again ask, what about the incompleteness of ZFC? If we start with a
countable transitive model (M, ε1) of ZFC, we may use inner models or forcing to
get other countable model (M ′, ε2) of ZFC with the same order-type of the class
of ordinals. By applying a re-enumeration we may assume M ′ = M . Numerous set-
theoretic statements, such as the ContinuumHypothesisCH or the Souslin Hypothesis
SH , may be true (or false) in (M, ε1) but false (or true) in (M, ε2). How is this utter
incompleteness consistent with the idea of internal categoricity? The answer to this
riddle is the following: An important part of the proof that an inner model is a model
of ZFC, or that a forcing extension preserves all the axioms of ZFC, is checking the
validity of the Separation Schema and the Replacement Schema. Just as in the case
of the Henkin construction for a non-standard model, we simply cannot allow extra
non-logical symbols in the formulas of the Separation Schema and the Replacement
Schema. If, on the other hand, we aim at the second order version ZFC2 with bound
relation variables instead of formulas in the Separation the Replacement Axioms, we
cannot get the independence results.
Both arithmetic and set theory manifest internal categoricity via a definable isomor-
phism. This means that the statement of internal categoricity is first order expressible
just as categoricity of a second order sentence is expressible in second order logic itself.
5 What is the value of internal categoricity?
Categoricity is such a beautiful and simple concept that one hesitates to modify it in
any way. However, categoricity is usually defined in set theory and may also depend
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on set theory. We have argued that internal categoricity is a more basic concept that
does not depend on set theory.
In the second order case internal categoricity is stronger than categoricity and can
be rephrased simply as provability of the statement of categoricity, because categoricity
can be expressed in the second order language itself. In the first order case the situation
is more complex. For one thing, we cannot directly express categoricity by first order
means. Conceivably we could still consider the provability of the set-theoretic state-
ment of categoricity but there are no non-trivial examples among first order theories.
Instead, the internal categoricity approach is to require categoricity only as far as an
alternative model can be ‘seen’. In the case of first order internal categoricity we offer
an alternative model, such as +′, ·′, ǫ′, to be ‘seen’ by adding it to the language and al-
lowing it to be used in the axioms. If the axioms remain true in the extended language
the power of the axioms generates an isomorphism.
Loosely speaking, first order arithmetic and set theory are categorical in their own
vicinity, among models they can see, but they are not categorical if models are allowed
to be constructed from ‘outside’ at will. The difference to second order arithmetic and
set theory is that the bound relation variables of the latter reach all possible models, in
the case of Henkin models all models coded by the Henkin model. In a sense, measured
by the Henkin model, they see all possible models, all possible models are in their
vicinity, and still their axioms are true. That explains why they are categorical. Still the
ultimate reason for their categoricity is that they possess the property of being internally
categorical. In this sense internal categoricity is the “right” concept of categoricity,
“right” in the sense of being the most fundamental.
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